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Abstract. k-times anonymous authentication (k-TAA) schemes allow
members of a group to be authenticated anonymously by application
providers for a bounded number of times. Dynamic k-TAA allows application providers to independently grant or revoke users from their own
access group so as to provide better control over their clients. In terms of
time and space complexity, existing dynamic k-TAA schemes are of complexities O(k), where k is the allowed number of authentication. In this
paper, we construct a dynamic k-TAA scheme with space and time complexities of O(log(k)). We also outline how to construct dynamic k-TAA
scheme with a constant proving eﬀort. Public key size of this variant,
however, is O(k).
We then describe a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and setup freeness of AP,
in which AP does not need to hold any secret while maintaining control
over their clients.
To build our system, we modify the short group signature scheme into a
signature scheme and provide eﬃcient protocols that allow one to prove
in zero-knowledge the knowledge of a signature and to obtain a signature
on a committed block of messages. We prove that the signature scheme
is secure in the standard model under the q-SDH assumption.
Finally, we show that our dynamic k-TAA scheme, constructed from
bilinear pairing, is secure in the random oracle model.
Keywords: k-TAA, dynamic k-TAA

1

Introduction

Teranisi et al. [19] proposed k-times anonymous authentication (k-TAA) so
that users of a group can access applications anonymously while application
providers (AP) can decide the number of times users can access their applications. In k-TAA, there are three entities, namely, group manager (GM), application providers (AP) and users. Users ﬁrst register to GM and each AP announce
independently the allowable number of access to its application. A registered
user can then authenticate himself to the AP’s anonymously, up to the allowed
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number of times. Anyone can trace a dishonest user who tries to access an application for more than the allowable number of times.
In k-TAA, AP’s have no control over the group of users accessing their applications. In actual scenarios, AP’s may wish to select their own group of users.
Dynamic k-TAA, proposed by Nguyen et al. [16], has added this ﬂexibility over
ordinary k-TAA systems. In a dynamic k-TAA, the role of AP’s is more active
and they can select their user groups, granting and revoking access of registered
users independently.
Many existing k-TAA schemes (and dynamic k-TAA schemes) [19, 16] are
quite eﬃcient, with time and space complexities independent of the total number
of users. However, size of the public key of AP’s, together with the communication cost between users and AP’s, are both of order O(k). The computational
cost of the user for an authentication protocol is also of order O(k). In this paper, we construct dynamic k-TAA scheme with complexity of O(log(k)). We also
outline how to reduce the proving cost to O(1) at the cost of public key size of
AP.
In constructing our scheme, we modify the short group signature from Boneh
et al. [3] into a signature scheme, which we shall referred to as BBS+ signature,
with two protocols, similar to [9, 11] (referred to as CL, CL+ respectively hereafter). We do not claim originality of this modiﬁcation as it has been outlined in
[11]. However, we supply the details of the modiﬁcation, together with the protocols and analyze its security. In particular, the protocol of showing possession
of a signature is diﬀerent from [3] in which the modiﬁed protocol achieve perfect zero-knowledge while the original protocol is computational. We prove that
BBS+ signature is secure in the standard model under the q-SDH assumption.
This BBS+ signature could be used as building blocks for other cryptographic
systems. It has similar properties to CL (based on Strong RSA) and CL+ signatures (based on LRSW). To sign a block of messages, the signature scheme
outperforms the existings schemes in the literature (signature size of CL+ is
linear to number of messages in the block to be signed, CL is 1346 bits while
BBS+ is only 511 bits).
The recently proposed group signature from [6] can also be modiﬁed into
signature scheme with eﬃcient protocol secured in the stand model. However,
the signing of a message have to be done in a bit-by-bit manner.
1.1

Related Works

Very recently, Teranishi and Sako [20] proposed an ordinary k-TAA scheme with
constant proving cost. We shall refer to it as TS06 hereafter. Our construction
can be thought of as an extension of TS06 to dynamic k-TAA to give AP more
control over their clients. This is achieved by the use of dynamic accumulator
and the idea of using dynamic accumulator for access control was introduced
in [10]. Finally, as pointed out in [20], k-TAA shares certain similarities with
compact e-cash schemes, introduced in [8]. The main diﬀerence being in k-TAA
schemes, each provider may chooses its only k and a user could authenticated
himself k1 times to provider-1, k2 times to provider-2, etc., while in a compact
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e-cash scheme, the user can only spend his wallet a total of k times to all the
shops combined. Nevertheless, the techniques used in our scheme is very similar to the compact e-cash scheme [8]. The main diﬀerence being we show how
to incorporate the provider’s name into the pseudo-random function such that
authentication to diﬀerent providers cannot be linked together.
Finally, the BBS+ signature we analyzed can be regarded as an extension of
a digital signature scheme very recently proposed by [17] to support signing of
block of committed messages.
Our Contributions.
– we construct eﬃcient dynamic k-TAA scheme.
– we reduce the security of our scheme to well-known intractable assumptions
in the random oracle model.
– we analyze an modiﬁcation of the BBS group signature, provide eﬃcient
protocols, and show its security in the standard model.
Organization. The rest of the paper is as follows. Preliminaries are presented
in Section 2. We then brieﬂy review the security notions in section 3. Our construction is shown in Section 4, followed by its variants in Section 5. Complexity
and security analysis are given in Section 6. Finally, we conclude in Section 7.

2
2.1

Preliminaries
Notations

Let e be a bilinear map such that e : G1 × G2 → GT .
–
–
–
–
–
–

G1 and G2 are cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p.
each element of G1 , G2 and GT has unique binary representation.
g0 , h0 are generators of G1 and G2 respectively.
ψ : G2 → G1 is a computable isomorphism from G2 to G1 , with ψ(h0 ) = g0 .
(Bilinear) ∀x ∈ G1 , y ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zp , e(xa , y b ) = e(x, y)ab .
(Non-degenerate)e(g0 , h0 ) = 1.

G1 and G2 can be same or diﬀerent groups. We say that two groups (G1 , G2 )
are a bilinear group pair if the group action in G1 , G2 , the isomorphism ψ and
the bilinear mapping e are all eﬃciently computable.
2.2

Mathematical Assumptions

Deﬁnition 1 (Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman). The Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman
(DDH) problem in G is deﬁned as follow: On input a quadruple (g, g a , g b , g c ) ∈
G4 , output 1 if c = ab and 0 otherwise. We say that the (t, )-DDH assumption
holds in G if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least  over random guessing
in solving the DDH problem in G.
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Deﬁnition 2 (q-Strong Diﬃe-Hellman). The q-Strong Diﬃe-Hellman (qSDH) problem in (G1 , G2 ) is deﬁned as follow: On input a (q + 2)-tuple (g0 , h0 ,
2
q
, output a pair (A, c) such that A(x+c) = g0 where
hx0 , hx0 , · · · , hx0 ) ∈ G1 × Gq+1
2
∗
c ∈ Zp . We say that the (q, t, )-SDH assumption holds in (G1 , G2 ) if no t-time
algorithm has advantage at least  in solving the q-SDH problem in (G1 , G2 ).
The q-SDH assumption is shown to be true in the generic group model [2].
Deﬁnition 3 (y-Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman Inversion Assumption). The
y-Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman Inversion problem (y-DDHI) in prime order group
2
y
G is deﬁned as follow: On input a (y + 2)-tuple g, g x , g x , · · · , g x , g c ∈ Gy+2 ,
output 1 if c = 1/x and 0 otherwise. We say that the (y, t, )-DDHI assumption
holds in G if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least  over random guessing
in solving the y-DDHI problem in G.
2.3

Building Blocks

Veriﬁable Random Function. Our constant-size dynamic k-TAA make use
of veriﬁable random function (VRF), introduced in [14]. Informally speaking, a
VRF is a pseudo-random function with non-interactive proof of correctness of its
output. The VRF used in our paper is due to Dodis et al. [12] and is described as
follows. The pseudo-random function f is deﬁned by a tuple (Gp , p, g, s), where
GT is a cyclic group of prime order p, g a generator of Gp and s is a seed in Zp . On
1
input x, fGp ,p,g,s (x) = g s+x+1 . Eﬃcient proof such that the output is correctly
formed (with respect to s and x in some commitment scheme such as Pedersen
Commitment [18]) exists and the output of f is indistinguishable from random
elements in Gp if the y-DDHI assumption in Gp holds. The veriﬁable random
function in [12] uses a stronger bilinear version of the y-DDHI assumption, see
[8] for details.
Accumulator. Our construction is built based on the accumulator with oneway domain due to [15]. Roughly speaking, an accumulator is an algorithm to
combine a large set of values ({xi }) into a short value v. For each value xj ∈ {xi },
a witness wj exists and with wj , it can be proved that x is indeed accumulated
into v. An accumulator is dynamic if it allows values to be added or deleted
dynamically.
Signature Scheme with Eﬃcient Protocols. In this paper, a signature
scheme with eﬃcient protocols refers to signature scheme with two protocols:
(1) a protocol between a user and a signer with keys (pk, sk). Both user and
signer agreed on a commitment scheme such as Pedersen commitment. The user
input is a block of messages (m1 , · · · , mL ) and a random value r such that
C=PedersenCommit(m1 , · · · , mL , r). After executing the protocol, user obtains
a signature on (m1 , · · · , mL ) from the signer while the signer learns nothing
about the block of messages. (2) a protocol to proof the knowledge of a signature. This allows the user to prove to a veriﬁer that he is in possession of a
signature. Examples include CL signature, CL+ signature [9, 11]. In this paper,
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we analyze another signature scheme with eﬃcient protocols which is a modiﬁcation of the short group signature from Boneh et al.[3], that we referred to as
BBS+ signature.

3
3.1

Security Model
Syntax

We follow the model of dynamic k-TAA in [16] and brieﬂy review them. A dynamic k-times anonymous authentication is a tuple (GMSetup, Join, APSetup,
GrantingAccess, RevokeingAccess, Authentication, PublicTracing) of six polynomial
time algorithms between three entities GM, APs, users. The following enumerates the syntax.
– GMSetup On input a unary string 1λ , where λ is a security parameter, the algorithm outputs GM secret key gsk and group public key gpk. All algorithms
below have implicitly gpk as one of their inputs.
– Join Protocol. This protocol allows a user to join the group and obtain a
member public/secret key pair (mpk, msk) from GM. The GM also add the
user’s identiﬁcation and member public key to an identiﬁcation list.
– APSetup An AP publishes its identity ID and announces the number of
times k a group member can access its application. It may also generate
certain public and private key for the AP.
– GrantingAccess Each AP manages its own access group AG which is initially
empty. This procedure allows the AP to give selected group members the
permission to access his application.
– RevokingAccess It allows the AP to remove a member from his access group
and stop a member from accessing his application.
– Authentication Protocol. The user authenticated himself to an AP under this
protocol. The user is authenticated only if it is in the access group of the
AP and the number of accesses have not exceeded the allowed number k.
AP records the transcripts of authentication in an authentication log.
– PublicTracing Anyone can execute this procedure using public information
and the authentication log. The outputs are user i’s identity, GM or NO-ONE
which indicates “user i tries to access more than k times”, “the GM cheated”
and “there is no malicious entity in this authentication log” respectively.
A dynamic k-times anonymous authentication must possess Correctness which
means that an honest member who is in the access group of an honest AP, and
has not authenticate himself for more than the allowed number of times, must
be authenticated by the AP.
3.2

Security Notions

We brieﬂy recall security requirements, for formal deﬁnition please refer to [16,
19].
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– D-Detectability. Roughly speaking, it means that a subset of colluded users
cannot perform the authentication procedure with the same honest AP for
more than the allowed number of times, or they must be detected by the
PublicTracing algorithm.
– D-Anonymity. It is required that no collusion of AP, users and GM can
distinguish between authentication executions of two honest group members
who are in the access group of the AP.
– D-Exculpability. It is required that an honest user cannot be accused of having performed the authentication procedure with the same honest AP for
more than the allowed number of time. It is also required that the PublicTracing algorithm shall not output GM if the GM is honest even though the
AP and the users colludes.

4

Our Construction

Our dynamic k-TAA is built from the q-SDH based accumulator due to Nguyen
[15] and a modiﬁcation of the BBS group signature [3], that we call BBS+
signature, which is a signature scheme with eﬃcient protocols. BBS+ signature
is unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attack in the standard model
under the q-SDH assumption and we also propose two protocols:(1) for issuing
a signature on a committed value (so the signer has no information about the
signed value), and (2) for proving knowledge of a signature on a committed
value. We ﬁrst describe the global common parameters, followed by descriptions
of BBS+ signature and ﬁnally our dynamic k-TAA scheme.
4.1

Global Common parameters

Let λ be the security parameter. Let (G1 , G2 ) be a bilinear group pair with
computable isomorphism ψ as discussed such that |G1 | = |G2 | = p for some
prime p of λ bits. Assume Gp be a group of order p where DDH is intractable.
Let H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp , Hevt {0, 1}∗ → Gp be cryptographic hash functions. Let
g0 , g1 , g2 , g3 be generators of G1 , h0 , h1 , h2 , h3 be generators of group G2 such
that ψ(hi ) = gi and u0 , u1 , u2 , u3 be generators of Gp such that relative discrete
logarithm of the generators are unknown. One possible way is to make use of
some hash functions f : {0, 1}∗ → G1 , g : {0, 1}∗ → Gp and set hi = f (seed, i),
gi = ψ(hi ), ui = g(seed, i) for some publicly known seed.
Remarks: the generation of this common parameters can be done by GM or
some trusted third parties.
4.2

BBS+ Signature

The idea of modifying the BBS group signature into a signature with eﬃcient
protocols is stated in [11]. We supply the details, provide eﬃcient protocols and
prove its security.
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KenGen. Randomly chooses γ ∈R Z∗p and computes w = h0 γ . The secret key is
γ and the public key is w.
Signing block of messages. On input (m1 , · · · , mL ) ∈ ZL
p , chooses e and a random
1

mL e+γ
]
. Signature on (m1 , · · · , mL )
number s. Computes A = [g0 g1s g2m1 g3m2 · · · gL+1
is (A, e, s).

Signature Veriﬁcation. To verify a signature (A, e, s) on (m1 , · · · , mL ) , check if
mL
, h0 ).
e(A, whe0 ) = e(g0 g1s g2m1 g3m2 · · · gL+1
Regarding security of BBS+ signature, we have the following theorem and
its proof is shown in appendix B.
Theorem 1. BBS+ signature is unforgeable against adaptively chosen message
attack under the q-SDH assumption.
Protocol for Signing Committed Block of Messages. The user computes a Pedersen

mL
.
Commitment on the block of messages to be signed by Cm = g1s g2m1 g3m2 · · · gL+1
The user also need to prove to the signer that Cm is correctly formed by the

mL
}. The signer
following PK: P K{(s , m1 , · · · , mL ) : Cm = g1s g2m1 g3m2 · · · gL+1
1



then chooses s , e, computes A = [g0 g1s Cm ] e+γ and sends back (A, e, s ) back
to the user. The user computes s = s + s and the signature on the block of
messages is then (A, e, s). For whatever block of messages (m1 , · · · , mL ), there

mL
and s completely hides the
exists an s such that Cm = g1s g2m1 g3m2 · · · gL+1
information about the block of messages. Thus, the signer learns nothing about
the block of messages to be signed.

Proof of Knowledge of A Signature. We give a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol for showing possession of a signature. Using any protocol for
proving relations among components of a discrete-logarithm representations of
a group element [7], it can be used to demonstrate relations among components of a signed block of messages. A user possessing a signature (A, e, s) on
the block of message (m1 , · · · , mL ) can compute SP K{(A, e, s, m1 , · · · , mL ) :
mL
}(M ) by ﬁrst computing the following quantities:
Ae+γ = g0 g1s g2m1 g3m2 · · · gL+1
r1 r2
r1
A1 = g1 g2 , A2 = Ag2 for some randomly generated r1 , r2 ∈R Z∗p . Then it
computes the 
following SPK Π5 .
Π5 : SP K (r1 , r2 , e, δ1 , δ2 , e, s, m1 , · · · , mL ) :
A1 = g1r1 g2r2 ∧ Ae1 = g1δ1 g2δ2 ∧
−e

e(A2 , h0 )

r1

δ1

s

e(A2 ,w)
e(g0 ,h0 )
m1

e(g2 , w) e(g2 , h0 ) e(g1 , h0 ) e(g2 , h0 )

=


mL

· · · e(gL+1 , h0 )

(M )

where δ1 = r1 e and δ2 = r2 e.
Regarding SPK Π5 , we have the following theorem which is straight forward
and the proof is thus omitted.
Theorem 2. Π5 is an non-interactive honest-veriﬁer zero-knowledge proof-ofknowledge protocol with special soundness.
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Remarks: this protocol is a diﬀerent from the protocol in [3], where the HVZK
is computational (under the DLDH assumption) while Π5 is perfect. One possible
reason is that the SDH protocol in [3] is used for group signature scheme where
certain user information in ‘veriﬁably encrypted’ within the protocol for GM to
revoke identity of the signer.
4.3

Overview of Our Construction

Join. The GM is in possession of the public/secret key pair of BBS+ signature.
User randomly generates x ∈ Z∗p and ux0 is the identity of the user. A membership
certiﬁcate of a user is a BBS+ signature (of the form (A, e) ) on the set of values
(s, t, x), where s and t are also random elements in Zp ∗. Finally, (ux0 , e) are placed
on an identiﬁcation list.
GrantingAccess/RevokeAccess. Each AP generates its own accumulator due to
Nguyen [15]. It accumulates the value e into the accumulator and gives the
witness wAP to the user. To revoke access, the AP removes the value e from the
accumulator.
In the variant of our scheme (to be shown in the next section), AP only publishes the access group and let the users work with the accumulator itself. This
make it possible to remove the interactive granting access/revoke access protocol. The cost to pay is that user have to perform O(|AccessGroup|) operations
to obtain his own witness.
Authentication. The idea is to have the users prove to the AP that it is in possession of a BBS+ signature (A, e, s) from the GM on the values (t, x), and that
e is inside the accumulator of the AP. To restrict the user from authenticating
himself for more than k times, pseudo-random function(PRF) due to Dodis and
Yampolskiy [12] is used as follow. Let uAP be a random element in a cyclic
s+J

1

+1

group equal to hash of identity of the AP. The user computes S = uAP AP and
proves that S is correctly formed with respect to the BBS+ signature component
s. Also, user needs to prove that 1 ≤ JAP ≤ k. In this way, for a particular AP ,
the user can only generate k valid S, which we called serial number. If he attempts to authenticate himself for more than k times, duplicated serial number
has to be used and can thus be detected.
Finally, to allow revocation of identity of user attempting to authenticate
R

is added,
himself for more than k times, another component T = ux0 uAP AP
where R is a random nonce chosen by the AP during each authentication attempt. User needs to prove that T is correctly formed. In case the user attempts
to use the same serial number to authenticate twice, due to R being diﬀerent,
the two T ’s shall be diﬀerent. With diﬀerent T ’s, identity of the cheater, ux0 , can
be computed.
Remarks: it is obvious that other signature schemes with eﬃcient protocol
such as CL, CL+ could also be used for our scheme. However, in our case,
BBS+ is most suitable for two reasons: (1) it is most eﬃcient in our context
t+J

+1
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and (2) the accumulator we used is based on the q-SDH assumption for which
security of BBS+ signature also relies on.
4.4

Details of Our Construction

GMSetup. The GM randomly selects γ ∈R Z∗p and computes w = h0 γ . The GM
also manages an identiﬁcation list which is a tuple (i, Ui , ei ) where i refers to
user i and Ui is an entry for identiﬁcation of user and ei is called the membership
public key of user i. See Join for a more detailed description of this item.
APSetup. Each AP publishes his identity ID and a number k, much smaller
than 2λ . In addition, each AP selects hAP ∈ G2 , qAP ∈ Z∗p . The public and
AP
and qAP respectively. The AP
secret keys for the AP are hAP , pAP = hqAP
maintains an authentication log, an accumulated value, which is published and
updated after granting or revoking access of a member, and a public archive
ARC which is describe as follows. The ARC is a 3-tuple (arc1 , arc2 , arc3 )
where arc1 is a component of the membership public key of a user, arc2 is a
single bit 0/1 indicating if the member was granted (1) or revoked (0). Finally,
arc3 is the accumulated value after granting or revoking the member. Initially,
the authentication log and ARC are empty while the accumulated value is set
to hAP .
Join. User i obtains his membership secret key from GM through the following
interactive protocol.


1. User i randomly selects s , t, x ∈R Z∗p and sends C  = g1s g2t g3x , along with

the proof Π0 = P K{(s , t, x) : C  = g1s g2t g3x } to GM.
2. GM veriﬁes that Π0 is valid and randomly selects s ∈R Z∗p . It sends s to
the user.
3. User computes s = s + s and add an entry (i, Ui ) = (i, ux0 ) to the identiﬁcation list and send a proof Π1 = P K{(s, t, x) : Ui = ux0 ∧ C = g1s g2t g3x ∧ C =

C  g1s }.

4. GM computes C = C  g1s , check that Π1 is valid , and selects e ∈R Z∗p .
1

It then computes A = (g0 C) e+γ and sends (A, e, s ) to the user. GM also
appends e to the entry (i, Ui ) to make it (i, Ui , e)
5. User checks if e(A, whe0 ) = e(g0 g1s g2t g3x , h0 ). It then stores (A, e, s, t, x). User’s
membership public key is e and membership secret key is (A, s, t, x).

GrantingAccess. An AP grants access to user i with membership public key e and
secret key (A, s, t, x) as follows. Suppose there are j tuples in the AP’s ARC and
the current accumulated value is vj . The AP computes a new accumulated value
vj+1 = vje+qAP . Then the AP adds (e, 1, vj+1 ) to the ARC. The user keeps w = vj
as his witness that his public key has been accumulated in the accumulated
value. Existing members in the access group update their own witness by the
information of ARC as follows. User with membership key ek and witness we
ek +qAP
such that week +qAP = vj computes wnew = vj wee−ek . In this case wnew
= vj+1
and wnew serves as a new witness for user ek .
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RevokingAccess. An AP revokes access from user i with membership public
key e, such that (e, 1, v) is a tuple in the ARC, as follows. Suppose there are
j tuples in the AP’s ARC and the current accumulated value is vj . The AP
1
e+q

computes vj+1 = vj AP . It then adds (e, 0, vj+1 ) to ARC. Similar to the case of
GrantingAccess, existing members in the access group update their own witness
by the information of ARC, which is shown as follows. Suppose user ek possesses
1
witness such that week +qAP = vj , it computes wnew = (we /vj+1 ) e−ek such that
ek +qAP
=[
wnew

1

vj
qAP +ek
vj+1

] e−ek = [

q

AP
vj+1

+e

qAP +ek
vj+1

1

] e−ek = vj+1 .

Authentication. The user manages a set of counters, one for each AP , JAP ,
such that it did not attempt to sign more than k times for each AP. User with
membership public key e and secret key (A, s, t, x), having granted access from
e+qAP
= vAP where vAP is
the AP and thus possesses a witness wAP such that wAP
the current accumulated value of the AP authenticates himself by the following
interactive protocol. For simplicity we drop the subscript AP for qAP and vAP .
– AP sends a random seed ∈ {0, 1}∗ to user. In practice, seed can be some random number or information about the current session. Both parties compute
R = H(seed) locally.
– User computes uAP = Hevt (IDAP ) where IDAD is the identity of the AP.
J

AP
User then computes S = uAP
knowledge manner (1) - (5):
1. Ae+γ = g0 g1s g2t g3x .
e+q
= v.
2. wAP
J

AP
3. S = uAP

1
+s+1

1
+s+1

R
+t+1

AP
, T = ux0 uAP
J

and proves in zero-

.

R

JAP +t+1
.
ux0 uAP

4. T =
5. 1 ≤ JAP ≤ k
– The abovecan be abstracted as
Π2 : SP K (A, e, s, t, x, w, JAP ) :
AP
Ae+γ = g0 g1s g2t g3x ∧ we+q = v ∧ S = uAP
J

R
JAP +t+1

T = ux0 uAP

1
+s+1

∧


∧ 1 ≤ JAP ≤ k (M )

– AP then veriﬁes that the SPK is correct. If yes, then accept and saves S, T ,
R into database.
– User then increases its counter, JAP , by one.
Instantiation of Π2 . Upon receiving seed, the user computes the following
quantities: A1 = g1r1 g2r2 g3r3 , A2 = Ag2r1 , A3 = wAP g3r2 , A4 = g1JAP g2t g3r4 , S =
J

1
+s+1

R
+t+1

AP
,T =ux0 uAP
, R = H(seed) and computes the following SPK Π3 .
Π3 : SP K (r1 , r2 , r3 , r4 , δ1 , δ2 , δ3 , δ4 , δJ , δt , e, s, t, x, JAP ) :

AP
uAP

J

Constant-Size Dynamic k-TAA

A1 = g1r1 g2r2 g3r3 ∧ Ae1 = g1δ1 g2δ2 g3δ3 ∧
e(A3 ,PAP )
δ2
r2
−e
∧
e(v,hAP ) = e(g3 , hAP ) e(g3 , pAP ) e(A3 , hAP )
e(A2 ,w)
s
t
x
δ1
r1
−e
e(g0 ,h0 ) = e(g1 , h0 ) e(g2 , h0 ) e(g3 , h0 ) e(g3 , h0 ) e(g3 , w) e(A2 , h0 )
δJ δ t δ 4
JAP t r4
uAP
JAP s
x
S ∧ A4 = g1 g2 g3 ∧ A4 = g1 g2 g3 ∧
S =S
uR
AP
T
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∧


J −δt x
= T JAP T t u−δ
u
u
∧
1
≤
J
≤
k
(M )
AP
0
0
0

where δ1 = r1 e, δ2 = r2 e, δ3 = r3 e, δJ = JAP x, δt = tx, δ4 = r4 x.
For a more detail protocol for the range check of JAP , please refer to the
appendix A.
PublicTracing. For two entries (SP K, S, T, R) and (SP K  , S  , T  , R ), if S = S  ,
then the underlying user of both authentications has not exceed its prescribed
usage k or they are from diﬀerent user.
R



−1

If S = S  , then everyone can compute ux0 = ( TT R )((R −R) ) . From ux0 and
the identiﬁcation list, output i as the cheating user. Now if ux0 does exists, then
it can be concluded that GM has deleted some data from the identiﬁcation list
and output GM.

5
5.1

Variants of Our Scheme
Trading computation eﬃciency for setup-freeness

We propose a variant of our scheme where the AP enjoys a high degree of setupfreeness. That is, the AP only needs to publish its access group, identity ID and
bound k. In this new scheme, interactive GrantingAccess and RevokingAccess
are no longer needed and there is no need for the AP to keep the ARC, too.
We highlight the changes as follow. In the init phase, a common accumulator
i
is initialized for all AP’s by randomly selecting q ∈R Z∗p and computing qi = h0 q
for i = 1, · · · , tmax , where tmax is the maximum number of users in an access
group. This procedure can be done by the GM or a trusted third party.
In APSetup, the AP only need to publish is identity and bound k. It also
needs to maintain a list of users allowed to access its application. Interactive
grating access and revoking access are removed. The AP simply needs to change
the content of the list of users in its access group.
Finally, users in the access group have to compute its own witness as follow.
Retrieve the list of membership public key {ej } of the AP’s access group. User
with membership public key ei ∈ {ej } ﬁrst accumulates the set {ej } into a value
 k=|{ej }|

(e +q)

k
. This quantity could be computed without
v by computing v = h0 k=1
knowledge of q using the qi . Note that both user and AP can compute v locally.

 k=|{ej }|

(ek +q)

(q+e )

such that vw i = v.
The user also computes the witness w by h0 k=1,k=i
The rest of the protocol follows the original scheme, and same SPK Π3 is
used.
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Trading Key-Size for Constant Proving Eﬀort

Motivated by [20], we outline how to a construct dynamic k-TAA with constant
proving eﬀort. Each AP has to publish k signatures Sig(1), · · · , Sig(k). In the
proof, instead of proving 1 ≤ JAP ≤ k (which has complexity O(logk)), the
user proves possession of signature on JAP (which has complexity O(1)). This
indirectly proves that JAP is within the range. The price to pay is that, the
public key size of the AP is now linear in k, and user colluding with AP can
be untraceable (since the malicious AP can issue several Sig(JAP ) for the user.
BBS+ signature is a natural candidate for the signature scheme used by the AP.

6
6.1

Security and Eﬃciency Analysis
Eﬃciency Analysis

Following the parameters suggested by Boneh et al.[4, 3], we can take p = 170
bits and each group element in G1 , G2 can be represented by 171 bits. The
authentication protocol will then consists of AP sending a 160-bit seed to the
prover, while SPK Π3 consists of 16 elements in Z∗p , 4 elements in G1 and 2
elements in Gp . Assume elements in Gp is represented by 171 bits (using another
elliptic curve group where pairing is not available[13]). Range proof of JAP could
be eﬃciently done if we set k = 2κ for some integer κ, using the protocol in
appendix A, bits transmitted is ((5 + 3κ) ∗ 170 + 171κ).
Then Π3 consists of 574.5+85logk bytes. On the other hand, if we implement
the tradeoﬀ described in Section 5, the range proof is replaced by the possession
of a BBS+ signature, which is of size 213 bytes. The following table summarizes
the communication cost of most (dynamic) k-TAA schemes in the literature.
Security parameters of all schemes are set such that they have comparable security with standard 1024-bit RSA signature (though it should be noted that, the
parameters are in slight favor towards NS05 [16], since they use group of orders
of a 160-bit prime which result in a slightly weaker security than the 1024-bit
RSA signature). The ﬁrst 3 entries of the table are taken from [16]. Note that k
is the allowable number of authentication.
TFS04 scheme
NS05 ordinary
NS05 dynamic
Our dynamic scheme
TS06 scheme*

Bytes sent by AP Bytes sent by User Dynamic
40
60k + 1617
No
20
60k + 224
No
20
60k + 304
Yes
20
700 or 574 + 85log(k)
Yes
20
500 or 300 + 85log(k)
No

* In TS06[20], full details of the proof of knowledge protocol is not given and
thus the ﬁgure is just an estimation. We assume same proof of knowledge on
range is used. TS06 make use of a group signature scheme [13](referred to as FI
scheme hereafter) as we use the BBS+ signature scheme for the join protocol.
Assume TS06 uses the signature protocol of the FI scheme for proving knowledge
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of a membership certiﬁcate, which is 1711 bits(very similar to BBS+). A point to
note is that if used this way, the zero-knowledge of the protocol is computational.
6.2

Security Analysis

Regarding the security of our dynamic k-TAA, we have the following theorem
whose proof is shown in is shown in appendix C.
Theorem 3. Our scheme possesses D-Detectability, D-Anonymity and D-Exculpability
under the y-DDHI assumptions in the random oracle model.

7

Conclusion

We constructed a constant-size dynamic k-TAA scheme and proved its security.
We also analyzed the eﬃciency of our system and compare it with existing
(dynamic) k-TAA schemes. Our scheme outperforms any existing dynamic kTAA schemes in the literature. Finally, the BBS+ signature we analyze could
be useful for other cryptographic systems.
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A

Range Proof for JAP

Secure and eﬃcient exact proof of range is possible in groups of unknown order
under factorization assumption [5]. Here, we make use of the fact that if we set
k = 2t for some integer t, eﬃcient range check for JAP could be achieved as
follows.
Let g, h be two generators of a cyclic group G of order p whose relative
discrete logarithm is unknown. To prove knowledge of a number J such that
0 < J ≤ k in a commitment CJ = g J hr , let Ji be the i-th bit of J for i = 1, · · · t.
Compute Ci = g Ji hri for some ri ∈R Z∗p for i = 1, · · · , t. Compute the following
SPK.

Πrange : SP K (J, a, b, r, ri ) :
t
j
CJ = g J hr ∧ CJ /g = g a hr ∧ j=1 (Cj )2 = g J hb ∧

i=t
[Ci = hri ∨ Ci /g = hri ]i=1
(M )
where a = J − 1, b =

t

j=1 rj 2

j

.

The total protocol consists of 4+t elements in Zp , 2t+1 challenges also in Zp
and t Ci ’s in G. In our protocol, total size of the range proof is (5+3t)∗170+t∗171
bits.

B

Security Analysis of BBS+ Signature

Proof (theorem 1, unforgeability against adaptively chosen message attack). Assume there exists a forger F which could forge a BBS+ signature under adaptively chosen message attack. Suppose it makes q signature queries. We construct
a simulator S which solves the q-SDH problem.
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q

S is given an instance of the q-SDH problem (g0 , h0 , hγ0 , · · · , hγ0 ). By applying
the technique of Boneh and Boyen in lemma 3.2 in [2], it obtains generator g0 ,
h0 , w = hγ0 and q SDH pairs (Bi , ei ) such that e(Bi , whe0i ) = e(g0 , h0 ) for each
i. Due to the technique of the same lemma, any new SDH pairs (B, e) besides
these q − 1 pairs lead to the solution of the original q-SDH problem.
∗
∗
1/a∗
.
S then randomly select e∗ , a∗ , k ∗ ∈R Z∗p , computes h1 = [(whe0 )k h−1
0 ]
(e∗ +γ)k∗ −1

. For j = 2 · · · L + 1, where L is the maximum length
Note that h1 = h0 a∗
μ
of the block of messages, randomly select μj ∈R Z∗p and compute hj = h1 j .
(w, g0 , h0 , h1 , · · · , hL+1 ) is then given to F as the system parameter. Denote
gi = ψ(hi ) for i = 0 · · · L + 1.
Out of the q signature queries, S randomly chooses one, which we shall
called query ∗. Suppose the message block to be signed for the i-th query is
(m1,i , · · · , mi ,i ) such that i ≤ L. Compute ti = m1,i μ2 + · · · + mi ,i μi +1 . Note
mi ,i
m
= g1ti .
that g2 1,i · · · gi +1
For the q−1 signature queries other than query ∗, S answers by using the q−1
SDH pairs (Bi , ei ) as follows. Randomly chooses si and computes ai = si + ti . S
1
is then to compute Ai = [g0 g1ai ] ei +γ and return the signature for the i-th query
as (Ai , ei , si ).
ai
γ+ei

1

Ai = [g0 g1ai ] ei +γ = Bi g1

ai k∗ (e∗ +γ)−ai
(ei +γ)a∗

= Bi [g0

a
(1− a∗i

= (Bi

)

ai k ∗
a∗

)([g0

]
(1−

]

a
(e −e∗ )a k∗
(1− a∗i − i a∗ i

= (Bi

)

ei −e∗
ei +γ

)

)

ai k ∗
a∗

)(g0

)

S then returns (Ai , ei , si ) as the signature.
∗
For query ∗, S chooses s∗ such that s∗ + ti = a∗ . Compute A∗ = g0k . Return
(A∗ , e∗ , s∗ ) as the signature.
Finally, F output a forged signature (A , e , s ) on message (m1 , · · · , m ).
There are three possibilities.
/ {ei , e∗ }]: Denote y = s + m1 μ2 + · · · + m μ +1 .
– Case I [e ∈


Ae +γ = g0 g1y
(



Ae +γ = g0

k∗ y(e∗ +γ)−y
)
a∗

A = (g0a
1
e +γ

B  = g0

a∗ −y
∗ (e +γ)
−k∗ y
a∗

= [A g0

k∗ y

)[(g0a∗ )

]



∗

(1− ee−e
)
+γ

]

a∗
a∗ −y−k∗ y(e −e∗ )

Uses this new SDH pair (B  , e ), S can solve the original q-SDH problem.
– Case II: [e = ei and A = Ai or e = e∗ and A = A∗ ]: This happens with
negligible probability unless F solves the relative discrete logarithm amongst
two of the hi ’s.
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– Case III: [e ∈ {ei , e∗ } and A = Ai or A = A∗ ]: With probability, 1/q,
e = e∗ . Deﬁne y as in case 1.
Ae

∗

+γ

= g0 g1y

A = (g0a
1
∗ +γ

B ∗ = g0e

a∗ −y
∗ (e∗ +γ)
−k∗ y

k∗ y

)(g0a∗ )
a∗

= [A g0 a∗ ] a∗ −y

S uses this new SDH pair to solve the original q-SDH problem.
If the success probability of F is , then in the worst case, success probability of
S is /q.

C

Security Analysis of Our Dynamic k-TAA

Proof (Sketch, theorem 3).
D-Detectability. Let A be an adversary who executes f join protocol with
simulator S acting as the GM. Let EΠ0 , EΠ1 be extractors of the SPK Π0 , Π1
respectively. For each join request, S acts exactly as an honest GM would, except
during step 3, where S runs the simulator EΠ1 to extract the values (s, t, x). From
the value s, S compute the tuple wl = (S1 , · · · , Sk , s, t, x) such that Si = S =
J

1
+s+1

for i = 1, · · · , k. Let Af = {Si,j |1 ≤ i ≤ f, 1 ≤ j ≤ k} after f
u0 AP
executions of the join protocol.
Since the protocol is done non-interactively, S is given control over the random oracle in addition to the black-box access to A. Moreoever, such extraction
requires rewind simulation and thus the join protocol cannot be executed concurrently.
For each AP, let uAP = Hevt (IDAP ) = ur0AP for some randomly chosen rAP .
Due to the soundness of the underlying SPK, Af , together with the set {rAP }
contains all valid S that A can produce, except with negligible probability. For
A to break D-Detectability, one of the following two happens. (1) A convince
an honest AP to accept an S for which it cannot generate an honest proof of
validity with some non-negligible probability. (2) A uses duplicated S but public
tracing does not output the identity of the user within the f join protocol.
Consider case (1) such that A convinces an honest AP to accept an invalid S
during the authentication protocol. Then A must have conducted a false proof
as part of the signature of knowledge such that one of the following is fake:
1. Ae+γ = g0 g1s g2t g3x .
2. we+q = v.1
J

AP
3. S = uAP

+s+1
R

.

JAP +t+1
.
ux0 uAP

4. T =
5. 0 ≤ JAP ≤ k
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Item 1 happens with negligible probability under the q-SDH assumption, as forging item 1 implies breaking the unforgeability of the BBS+ signature discussed
above. Item 2 happens with negligible probability under the assumption that the
accumulator is secure[15] (also reduced to q-SDH assumption). Item 3,4 happens
with negligible probability under the DL assumption (which will be subsumed
by the y-DDHI assumption in the theorem). Item 5 happens with negligible
probability if ZKPOK of committed number lies in an exact interval exists. For
instance, [5] propose such an ZKPOK under the factorization assumption. If
technique of [5] is used, in the setup procedure, a group of unknown order have
to be set up. On the other hand, if we set k = 2t , then we can use the protocol outlined in A. We omit the details of exact range proof in the protocol for
simplicity. Thus, the total success probability of A in case 1 is negligible.
Consider case (2). It have already been proved in case (1) that A cannot
have an honest AP to accept an invalid S with non-negligible probability. Since
A must use valid S, to authenticated more than k times for the same AP, it must
uses dulplicated S. Let the honest AP accept two authentication (S, SP K1 ) and
(S, SP K2 ) for some valid S such that S rAP ∈ Af . Since the AP is honest,
R1
+t+1

AP
R1 = R2 with high probability. We are to show that T1 = ux0 uAP
J

and

R2

JAP +t+1
ux0 uAP

T2 =
so that identity of the cheater could be recovered from the
PublicTracing algorithm.
Since R1 , R2 are chosen by the honest AP, this uniquely ﬁxes T1 , T2 as the
only valid T’s to accompany the dulplicated S in these two authentications.
To deviate from these S and T , A must conduct fake proof of validity of the
authentication protocol which we already shown to happen with only negligible
probability. Thus, PublicTracing output the identity of the cheater without overhelming probability.
During the course of the running of A, it is allowed to query several oracles.
We outline how S simulate these oracles. The join oracle is simulated by invoking
the signing oracle of the BBS+ signature (protocol for signing committed block
of messages, which involve extracted the committed block of messages in the
commitment. Again, this requirement make the join procedure non-concurrent).
Authentication oracle is simulated by randomly generate s, t, x, JAP , backpatch
the random oracle and simulate the signature of knowledge of the authentication
procedure.
D-Anonymity. The adversary A, colluding with GM and all AP’s, create the
global system parameters. Finally, A will be asked to engage in a legal number
of authentication protocol with some real user j or simulator S.
For each authentication procedure, S simulate as follow.
– S is given seed and compute R = H(seed).
– S random chooses s, t, x and a random JAP ∈R {1, · · · , k} and compute
1
+s+1

R
+t+1

AP
AP
, T = ux0 uAP
.
S = uAP
– S simulated a proof of A, w, e, s, t, x, JAP such that (1)Ae+γ = g0 g1s g2t g3x ,
J

J

AP
(2)we+q = v, (3) S = uAP
J

1
+s+1

R
+t+1

AP
, (4) T = ux0 uAP
J

, (5)0 ≤ JAP ≤ k.
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– The proof of item (3), (4), (5) are real while (1) is handled by the simulator
for a proof of knowledge of a BBS+ signature and (2) is handled by the
simulator for a proof of knowledge of the accumulator.
We now explain why the output of S is computationally indistinguishable from
the output of a real user. The idea is that during the join protocol A learn
nothing about the set of secrets of (s, t, x) of the real user, due to the security of
the BBS+ signature. Thus, the values (s, t, x) chosen by S is indistinguishable
from those chosen by real users. Due to the security of the PRF[12], S, T are
indistinguishable from randomly elements under the y-DDHI assumption. Thus,
A can distinguish a real user and a simulator only if it could distinguish a real
proof or a simulated proof of the BBS+ signature, or it could break the security
of the PRF(y-DDHI assumption). The probability is negligible under y-DDHI
assumption.
D-Exculpability. D-Exculpability for GM is quite straight forward. Suppose
the GM is honest but two authentication trascript (S, R1 , SP K1 ), (S, R2 , SP K2 )
pointed to an entry not exists in the identiﬁcation list, then someone have been
able to fake the proof of knowledge either in the join protocol or in the authetntication protocol, which happen with negligible probability. Proof of DExculpability for honest user is also quite straight forward. The proof of knowledge of T in the authentication protocol involve the user secret x. To slander
an honest user, adversary without knowledge of user secret x have to fake the
knowledge of T which involve knowledge of x to base u0 . This happens with
negligible probability.

